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Abstract. Evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics are both approaches to
explain human behaviour from a genetic point of view. Nonetheless, thus far the development
of these disciplines is anything but interdependent. This paper examines the question
whether evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomics. Firstly, a possible
inconsistency between the two approaches is reviewed, viz. that evolutionary psychology
focuses on the universal human nature and disregards the genetic variation studied by
behavioural genomics. Secondly, we will discuss the structure of biological explanations.
Some philosophers rightly acknowledge that explanations do not involve laws which are
exceptionless and universal. Instead, generalisations that are invariant sufﬁce for successful
explanation as long as two other stipulations are recognised: the domain within which the
generalisation has no exceptions as well as the distribution of the mechanism described by
the generalisation should both be speciﬁed. It is argued that evolutionary psychology can
contribute to behavioural genomic explanations by accounting for these two speciﬁcations.
1. Introduction
1.1. Evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics
Currently, evolutionary psychologists are attempting to unify psychology
with the hard science of biology (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 1997).
Ironically, the two grand biological approaches to behaviour are themselves
not uniﬁed: evolutionary adaptive accounts on the one hand and behavioural
genetics and behavioural genomics on the other seem to be developing in
quite autonomous ways without much mutual interest. There is little author
overlap between the most representative journals of both disciplines and their
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textbooks seem to ignore each other (Bailey 1998). The question that we will
be concerned with in this paper is whether despite their differences, evolu-
tionary psychology might to a certain extent be uniﬁed with, or contribute to
behavioural genomics.
One of the reasons that evolutionary psychology and behavioural
genomics may ignore each other is that both approaches, although biological
in origin, have a different history and orientation towards the biology of beha-
viour. Evolutionary psychology in succession to sociobiology presupposes
that human stable behaviour patterns and standard ways of experience are
the products of the human brains and focuses on the evolved properties of
the human nervous system (see e.g., Barkow et al. 1992; Buss 1995, 1999;
Cartwright 2000; Cosmides and Tooby 1995; Cziko 1995; Donald 1995;
Passingham 1982; Plotkin 1997; Van Hezewijk 2003; Barendregt 2003b).
The human mind/brain is understood as being composed of functional parts
like other bodily organs are structured. Evolutionary psychology borrows the
conceptual framework of natural selection of inherited characteristics from
evolutionary biology and claims that the human nervous system is function-
ally organised to serve survival and reproduction. These brain functions are
referred to as ‘psychological adaptations’ which reﬂect the domain speciﬁc
adaptations the human species has developed during evolution as solutions
to problems of earlier ancestors of the species (Gigerenzer 2001). Two main
theoretical tenets of evolutionary psychology can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, because selection typically produces complex and species universal
adaptations, evolutionary psychology disregards variation and concentrates
on the universal human nature. Secondly, the universal human nature consists
of hundreds or thousands of evolved modules, selected to perform speciﬁc
functions. Thus, evolutionary psychology’s explanations of stable behaviour
patterns involve a focus on the universal, yet domain speciﬁc, functional
design of human nature.
Behavioural genomics, on the other hand, is the next (post-genomic) step
in genetic research of behaviour. It is not so much interested in the evolu-
tionary and adaptive aspects of behaviour but much more in gene-behaviour
causal pathways. Traditionally, behavioural genetics asks whether and how
much behaviour is inﬂuenced by genes. Evidence for genetic inﬂuence comes
from inter alia adoption and twin studies with which the heritability of
behavioural traits can be measured (see e.g., Boomsma et al. 2002; Spector
2000). These quantitative analyses are now considered as important but only
ﬁrst steps; the next steps concern the mechanisms by which speciﬁc genes
affect behaviour (Dick and Rose 2002; De Geus 2002; McGufﬁn et al. 2001;
Plomin and Essi 2001). Behavioural genomics involves the analyses of the
contribution of genes to behavioural functions, tracing the chain of cellular
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and molecular mechanisms between behavioural and genetic levels (Plomin
and Crabbe 2000). Thus, in contrast with heritability research behavioural
genomics includes molecular genetic studies in order to understand how
genes are expressed in speciﬁc behaviours.
1.2. Uniﬁcation
The concept of unity is itself not a uniﬁed concept and has had many different
interpretations in the history of science (see Morrison 2000, Chapter 1). In
this paper we will be concerned with the uniﬁcation of theories and explan-
ations. Gold and Stoljar (1999), following Maudlin (1996), distinguish three
different intertheoretic relations that may be denoted by ‘uniﬁcation’: dissol-
ution, reduction, and conjunction. Uniﬁcation by dissolution refers to the
situation when two theories are dissolved by a conceptual advance, which
reveals that both domains are features of a single theoretical domain (e.g.,
in the philosophy of mind double-aspect theories attempt to achieve uniﬁca-
tion by dissolution). Theory reduction establishes a uniﬁcation between two
theories by showing how one theory is completely derivable from the other
one (Nagel 1961: chapter 11). Finally, uniﬁcation by conjunction occurs when
two theories are simply joined together. Although a weak kind of uniﬁcation,
conjunction is not trivial (Gold and Stoljar 1999). Firstly, both theories should
not be mutually inconsistent or conﬂicting.1 Secondly, the relation must be
somehow interesting enough. As Maudlin puts it, that a theory of embryonic
development is consistent with a theory about the formation of the rings of
Saturn is not sufﬁcient to render the two uniﬁed (Maudlin 1996: 130). Thus,
in order to qualify as a uniﬁcation the conjunction of two theories must bring
something new to them: for example, if an elliptical explanation is comple-
mented with information provided by the other theory. Also, as suggested
by Lakatos (1970) a uniﬁcation is not trivial if the conjunction predicts the
facts that the two theories predicted as well as some new facts that neither did
seperately.
In this paper, we shall focus on the conjunctive uniﬁcation of adaptive and
genomic explanations. More speciﬁcally, the question is whether adaptive
explanations can contribute to behavioural genomic explanations. In order
to do this, we must show, ﬁrstly, that adaptive and genomic explanations
are not inconsistent. One reason why they might be inconsistent is that they
focus on different (perhaps even conﬂicting) features of behaviour: evolu-
tionary psychology studies features of behaviour shared by all human beings,
while behavioural geneticists study a population’s variance. This issue will
be reviewed in section 2 and we will conclude that there is nevertheless a
substantial overlap between both approaches. Secondly, it must be shown
that the conjunction of evolutionary and genomic explanations is not trivial.
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In section 3 we will discuss the structure of biological explanations from a
philosophy of science point of view, while in section 4 we will apply these
insights to explanations from behavioural genomics as well as evolutionary
psychology and propose two reasons why evolutionary psychology might be
relevant to behavioural genomic explanations. In the ﬁnal section, we will
discuss some limitations of our proposals.
2. Variation and uniformity
2.1. Human monomorphism
Despite the theoretical connections between evolutionary psychology and
behavioural genomics as reﬂected by the shared use of a ‘gene’ concept,
the two approaches differ in at least one important respect. As observed
above, evolutionary psychology focuses on the structure of behaviour aiming
to uncover the uniform functional design of human nature. By doing this,
the evolutionary approach aims at the qualitative characteristics and the
explanation of ‘normal’ behaviour (Cosmides and Tooby 1997). Behavioural
genomics on the other hand, investigates the genetic background of individual
differences approaching cognition as an individual trait (Plomin 2002). Its
main methodology is the analysis of variance trying to discover the propor-
tion of variance of behavioural traits attributable to genetic variance. So, one
difference between evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics is the
way that ‘genes’ are conceived: either as the information carriers for the
retention of universal adaptations in the species or as the causes of differences
between individual members of that species.
This difference has been put forward most explicitly by Tooby and
Cosmides (1990). Their argument is that the complex functional design
of human adaptations requires design monomorphism. The reason is that
complex systems depend on the interdependence of the integrated parts. In
order for the parts to interact in a predictable and organised way, each part
must be functionally uniform and regular. In other words, each part must rely
on the behaviour of every other component. Although component parts may
show considerable variation in some properties (e.g., no two stomachs have
exactly the same size and shape) the basic design of each organ is the same.
So, from the perspective of the adaptive, qualitative design every individual of
a species is uniform and individual variation must be minor and quantitative.
For sexually reproductive organisms like humans, this constraint becomes
even more pressing. During sexual reproduction, the genes of the parents
are to a large extent randomly recombined, forming genetically different and
unique offspring. Such a mixture of genes can only work if the functional
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designs related to these different genes are extremely similar to begin with
(Pinker 1994: 326).
Evolutionary psychologists do not claim that natural selection can operate
without heritable variation. On the contrary, heritable variation is essential for
selection processes (Hull et al. 2001). But according to Tooby and Cosmides
(1990), heritable variation is essential only for the evolutionary processes as
input for natural selection. The output is a monomorphic adaptive design.
The variation that is initially necessary is eliminated by natural selection: the
longer natural selection acts, the more heritable variation is ‘used up’ and
the better, ‘winning’ variant becomes the more common one. Eventually this
variant is ﬁxed in the gene pool and becomes a universal part of the species’
genetic endowment.
A corollary of this is that adaptively signiﬁcant characteristics tend to
have low or zero heritability (Crawford and Anderson 1989). Heritability
as measured by behavioural genetics, which is the basis of behavioural
genomic analyses, indicates the proportion of phenotypic variance attribut-
able to genetic variance. But if selection has operated on a trait intensely for a
long time, all genetic variation related to that trait must have been eliminated
and, consequently, heritability reaches zero. It is claimed that the converse
also holds: traits with much heritable variation are those traits that are not
adaptations. According to Tooby and Cosmides, then, ‘behavior geneticists
tend to be studying phenomena that are not themselves adaptations . . . , but
the raw material out of which future adaptations may someday be made’
(1990: 38).
If this analysis were correct, there would be a problem for attempts
to conjunctively unify evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics.
The gene-behaviour relationships genomics is interested in would be very
different from the gene-adaptation relationships evolutionary psychologists
focus on. There would be a ‘natural’ dividing line between both disciplines
with on the one side pan-human adaptations and on the other side human
variation of characteristics that are not adaptations.
2.2. Adaptive genetic variation
For a number of reasons, however, the argument of Tooby and Cosmides
seems to be problematic. One problem is that genetic analyses demonstrate
moderate to high heritabilities for almost all behaviours that have been
studied (McGufﬁn et al. 2001). According to Plomin and Colledge (2001),
the question is not whether there are domains in psychology which show
genetic inﬂuence, but whether there are areas that do not show any herit-
ability. Also, human traits that are supposed to have been strongly selected
such as language ability and intelligence have rather high heritabilities and
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this seems hard to reconcile with the view that adaptations have zero or low
heritability (Plomin and Petrill 1997; Miller and Todd 1998).
It also seems that the interdependence of the component parts of integrated
systems does not prohibit qualitative variation in those parts. David Sloan
Wilson (1994) pointed to the possibility that genetic polymorphisms can be
maintained by natural selection if the maintained phenotypes have a ﬁtness
that is sufﬁciently high while the intermediate forms have a relatively low
ﬁtness (a saddle shaped ﬁtness function). An example of this is the escape
tactics of garter snakes (Bailey 1998; Brodie 1989). Under threat mottled
snakes tend to remain motionless, while striped snakes tend to ﬂee in a
straight line. Intermediate phenotypes have lower ﬁtness (e.g., mottled snakes
ﬂeeing in a straight line), but the two phenotypes which are maintained have
a ﬁtness high enough to be selected for. Another example is the evolutionary
very relevant phenotype of fertility. Human fertility contains genetic variation
that may be adaptive and seems to co-vary with other traits related to fertility,
like age at puberty or sexual and parenting behaviour (Rodgers et al. 2001).
Both Wilson (1994) and Buss and Greiling (1999) refer to frequency
dependent selection as a possible cause for adaptive genetic variation. If the
ﬁtness of one variant depends on the presence of other variants, all these
variants may be sustained by natural selection. An example is biological sex:
the reproductive success of one sex depends on the availability of mates
of the other sex and as a result selection will favour an equilibrium with
equal ratios for both sexes. Frequency dependent selection also occurs within
sex, for instance the parasitising mate strategies of the bluegill sunﬁsh. It’s
strategy is to mate with a female, but to leave the parenting of the offspring
to other males. The parasitising strategies can only be successful if they are
not too frequent, because their success depends on the presence of enough
non-parasites that will parent the offspring.
Frequency dependent selection may also obtain among human behaviour.
The evolution of co-operation in the context of a prisoner’s dilemma is a
point in case (Axelrod 1984; Badcock 2000: chapter 3). When faced with
a series of iterated prisoner’s dilemmas actors can perform a number of
different strategies. Computer simulations demonstrate that the strategy to
always defect is more successful and outreproduces the strategy that is always
co-operative. But even more successful is TIT FOR TAT (Axelrod 1984), the
strategy that simply copies the previous move of the opponent. Interestingly,
TIT FOR TAT is equally successful as the co-operative strategy, because
mutually they will be constantly co-operative. As a result, in a population
the co-operative strategy and TIT FOR TAT will both be maintained, thanks
to TIT for TAT that functions like a buffer against defective strategies.
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It is important for present purposes that – contrary to what evolutionary
psychologists assert – the genes referred to by evolutionary psychology and
the genes used in behavioural genomics may well be the same genes. This
challenges the view that evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics
are disconnected and completely separated ﬁelds of research. The question
then arises how explanations in both disciplines relate to each other if they
indeed involve the same genes. Might an evolutionary perspective contribute
to explanations in behavioural genomics?
3. Explanations in biology
3.1. Laws
Analyses of biological explanations often turn towards the matter of the exist-
ence of laws in biology. Laws are commonly interpreted as generalisations
that are, ﬁrstly, exceptionless. Any case in which the antecedent of the gener-
alisation but not the consequent holds, excludes the generalisation from being
a law. Secondly, laws are not limited to speciﬁc locations or speciﬁc times,
i.e., the scope of the quantiﬁers in a law covers all space and time. Addition-
ally, laws must be able to support counterfactuals in order to distinguish truly
lawful generalisations from generalisations that merely accidentally have the
same form of laws. It is because of these characteristics that laws function
in explanations. According to the classic interpretation, to explain an event
is to show why it had to happen (e.g., Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; J.S.
Mill 1970/1872: 305). Laws are explanatory, because they show both how
the explanandum could have been expected in advance if the relevant condi-
tions would have been known and answer, what Woodward (2000) calls,
what-if-things-had-been-different-questions.
However, this philosophical image of laws and explanation does not seem
to ﬁt biological generalisations and explanations (Mitchell 2000; Van der
Steen and Kamminga 1991; however see Sober 1997, for a defence of the
possibility of biological laws). The biological world is diverse and rich in
exceptions and biological generalisations have a limited range of explanatory
power (Brandon 1997). Moreover, biological generalisations are typically
contingent on a speciﬁc historical pathway which, depending on past circum-
stances, could have been different (Beatty 1997). In what follows, these
violations will be explicated in more detail.
3.2. Invariance instead of exceptionlessness
According to Woodward (2000), the feature that is decisive for generalisa-
tions to be explanatory is not its supposedly being exceptionless, but rather
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its being invariant. Woodward’s suggestion concerning invariance is this: a
generalisation that describes the relation between two or more variables is
invariant if the generalisation does not break down when various conditions
change. Some of these other conditions must explicitly ﬁgure in the gener-
alisation itself, although a generalisation can be invariant across changes
in background conditions as well. It is an important aspect of Woodward’s
discussion that generalisations may be invariant under some changes but
need not be invariant under all changes. Hence, unlike lawfulness, invari-
ance is not an all-or-nothing matter. Depending on the range of changes over
which a generalisation continues to hold, generalisations may be more or less
invariant. A generalisation is more invariant if it holds under a larger set of
changes or a more important one than other generalisations. Thus, according
to Woodward, there is a connection between the range of changes under
which a generalisation is invariant and explanatory depth: fragile generalisa-
tions do have a lot of exceptions and hold under some but not many changes
in conditions, while generalisations that hold under more changes provide
deeper explanations.
An example provided by Woodward (2000) of a generalisation in physics
is the ideal gas law: PV/T = R, describing the relation between the pres-
sure, the volume, and the temperature of a gas, and the constant R. If, e.g.,
the temperature of the gas is changed, the pressure or the volume of the
gas (or both) will change in such a way that R remains constant. Thus the
generalisation continues to hold in the face of these changes. That is, the
generalisation is invariant under changes in the temperature of the gas. The
generalisation, moreover, is also invariant under interventions in background
conditions: e.g., the mass of the gas (a variable that does not ﬁgure in the
generalisation and is thus a background condition) can be changed without
the generalisation breaking down. Also, more trivial background conditions
like the colour of the container holding the gas can be changed while the
generalisation continues to hold. But the ideal gas law is, despite its name, not
truly a law, since it is not exceptionless: the generalisation does not hold when
the volume of the gas is small in relation to the volume of the constituent
molecules. Thus, although the ideal gas law continues to hold under a lot of
changes in conditions, it fails under other conditions. Consequently, the ideal
gas law should not be considered a law because it is not exceptionless, but it
is an invariant generalisation under many changes in conditions and is thus
explanatory.
In the natural sciences, generalisations are often equations describing the
relation between different variables. In biology on the other hand, explanatory
generalisations are often generalisations describing mechanisms. Mechan-
isms are compositions of entities and activities, which are organised in such a
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way that they are productive of regular changes from start to ﬁnish condi-
tions (Machamer et al. 2000). A common strategy to furnish mechanistic
explanations is the decomposition of a system into the entities and activities
that constitute the mechanism that brings about the behaviour (Bechtel and
Richardson 1993). By decomposing a system into smaller entities, mech-
anistic explanations are downward looking: behaviour at a higher level of
analysis is explained by regularities at a lower level. For example, the trans-
mission of a signal from one neurone to another across the synaptic cleft can
be explained by a decomposition of the synapse into generalisations about the
behaviour of component parts (terminal buttons releasing neurotransmitters,
neurotransmitters diffusing across the cleft, post-synaptic receptors reacting
with the neurotransmitters).
Also, in the case of biological generalisations describing mechanisms it
is invariance rather than lawfulness which is the important characteristic for
explanation (Woodward 2001). These generalisations are invariant, as long
as they correctly describe the relation between the start and ﬁnish conditions
when various (other) conditions change.
3.3. Distribution instead of universality
Besides having exceptions, biological generalisations often do not cover all
space and time. That is, biological generalisations violate the requirement
of universality. The present reading of universality differs somewhat from
the standard interpretation of universality. The present sense of universality
corresponds to what Schaffner called universality1, which refers to organism
scope or ‘the extent to which a physiological mechanism will be found in
all organisms’ (Schaffner 1993: 121). As Darden pointed out, this sense
of universality is not limited to organism scope; issues of the scope of
applicability also arise above and below the organism level (Darden 1996).
Often mechanisms are the result of a history of selection pressures that
may have been different. This idea is called the Evolutionary Contingency
Thesis (Beatty 1997). Biological mechanisms are products of evolution, but
the past histories of organisms could have been different because of different
selective forces which would have resulted in very different mechanisms.
According to Beatty, it is because of the evolutionary contingency that we
cannot expect a single mechanism to underlie a complete ﬁeld of biolog-
ical phenomena. In order for a mechanism to be the universal mechanism
underlying a speciﬁc phenomenon, it has to be assumed that either this mech-
anism arose very early in history and has been maintained in all organisms
ever since as a homologous trait, or that it arose independently in all organ-
isms and has been maintained ever since as an analogous trait. The ﬁrst
option implies an extreme phylogenetic conservatism, the second an extreme
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parallel evolution.2 Neither options are likely. Beatty therefore concludes
that evolution has not resulted in only one mechanism underlying a speciﬁc
phenomenon but, instead, in a variety of underlying mechanisms. Hence,
biological mechanisms do not cover all space, but only a portion of it.
So, mechanisms are not universal but distributed, based on their evolu-
tionary history. According to Waters (1998) a great deal of the generalisations
in biology describe distributions, either implicitly or explicitly. They gener-
alise, for example, about the occurrence of species over geographic regions
(e.g., the distribution of elephants over Asia and Africa) or of certain types
of species (e.g., marsupials over the continents). Distributions may gener-
alise about characteristics over different taxa (e.g., the property of having
wings over birds and insects) or about entities over various parts within indi-
viduals (e.g., the distribution of dopaminergic neurones in human brains).
Although the variety of forms of these generalisations is wide, they all share
an important feature: they are not generalisations about the behaviour of
entities but about their occurrence (Waters 1998).
3.4. Explanation without laws
The considerations above about invariance and distributions have important
consequences for explanations in biology. Laws are not essential for
successful explanation: an appeal to invariant generalisations or mechanisms
may sufﬁce. That is because explanations involving invariant generalisations
exhibit a systematic pattern between the various conditions that can be used
in order to demonstrate how the explanandum could have been expected and
answer what-if-things-had-been-different-questions (Woodward 2000). The
ideal gas law, for instance, provides an explanation of why the pressure of a
gas in a container increases to a certain value when its temperature increases
by demonstrating how the new pressure could have been expected from the
information about the new value of temperature, and what the new pressure
would have been if the temperature would not have increased or would have
increased to a different value.
Invariant generalisations are not laws, however. Compared to explanation
based on laws, mechanistic explanation requires a number of further stip-
ulations. These additional stipulations are directly related to the fact that
invariant generalisations are on the one hand not exceptionless and on the
other hand not universal. According to Woodward, an invariant general-
isation is explanatory only in so far as it correctly describes the relation
between the variables operating in it, that is, only within the domain of
changes in the conditions under which the generalisation remains invariant.
Outside of this domain of invariance the generalisation has exceptions and
is not explanatory. So, the ﬁrst stipulation concerns the domain of invari-
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ance within which the generalisation has no exceptions and hence within
which the generalisation can be used legitimately for explanation. The second
condition for successful explanation with non-lawlike generalisations results
from the violation of the universality requirement. Invariant generalisation
provide predictive power and are explanatory, but only as long as one
knows whether the mechanism referred to in the explanation is indeed the
mechanism operating (Darden 1996). Protein synthesis is explained by the
Central Dogma (DNA → RNA → protein) but only for organisms which
use DNA as a template for protein synthesis. Because different mechanisms
may underlie the same phenomenon, explanations of that phenomenon need
a speciﬁcation of the scope of the underlying mechanism. Information about
whether a certain mechanism accounts for a phenomenon or another one
is provided by the distribution of that mechanism. So, the second stipula-
tion for successful mechanistic explanations concerns a speciﬁcation of the
mechanism’s distribution.
In short, explanations in biology require invariant generalisations, which
often describe mechanisms. Invariant generalisations are explanatory but
they are not laws because they are neither exceptionless nor universal.
Generalisations are only explanatory within the domain of changes of the
conditions under which the generalisation remains invariant and only for
those cases where the mechanism described by the generalisation is distrib-
uted. Successful explanation, then, not only requires invariant generalisations
or mechanisms, but also information about their domain of invariance and
information about their distributions.
4. Behaviour genomic and evolutionary explanations
4.1. The domain of invariance of genomic generalisations
Explanations provided by behavioural genomics are mechanistic explanations
(Barendregt 2003a). In the light of the preceding discussion, an analysis of the
generalisations that are used in behavioural genomics reveals that these are
very fragile and have a lot of exceptions. Whether or not a speciﬁc gene will
affect behaviour depends on a complex of other genes and environmental
circumstances. That is, genetic generalisations are not invariant under all
possible changes in conditions. For example, dietary interventions disrupt
the genetic effect of a mutation in the gene PAH, the mutation that normally
causes symptoms of phenylkotonuria (or PKU) such as severe mental retarda-
tion. Thus, the generalisation describing the relation between PAH and mental
retardation often fails as a result of a change in an environmental condition.
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Genomic generalisations are invariant but only within a relatively limited
domain speciﬁed by other genetic and environmental conditions.
A further complication is that almost nothing is known about the bound-
aries of the domain of invariance of genomic generalisations. There is little
knowledge about, for instance, which environmental circumstances might
break down the generalisations describing the relationship between genes
and cognition, intelligence, or other behavioural phenotypes. From a genetic
perspective it is also very difﬁcult to determine the exact boundaries of the
domain of changes in the conditions over which behavioural genomic gener-
alisations are invariant. One reason for this difﬁculty is the impossibility of
experimenting in human behavioural genomics. In order to reveal the limits
of a generalisation it is essential to manipulate the conditions in it (Woodward
2000), but in human genomics such manipulations are, inter alia for ethical
reasons, not always possible.
The fragility of genome-behaviour relationships has also some practical
problems for the research program of behavioural genomics: gene ﬁnding
strategies are often obstructed because speciﬁc genes contribute too little to
behaviour to be detected. However, the power of genomic searches can be
boosted by the use of so-called endophenotypes. Endophenotypes are inter-
mediate traits that directly index the behaviour of interest but are thought to
be less removed from the relevant gene action (Almasy and Blangero 2001).
For instance, genomic research on general cognitive ability (the ‘g’ factor)
may use behavioural endophenotypes which test speciﬁc cognitive abilities,
such as cognitive tests for executive functioning, inhibitory control, attention,
working memory, etc. Because the endophenotypes are thought to be closer
to gene action, it is assumed that it will be relatively easier to identify genes
for endophenoptypes than for the overall behaviour. In short, this ‘divide-
and-conquer’ strategy (De Geus and Boomsma 2001: 245) promises that
detecting genes for behaviour will be advanced by conﬁning human cognition
to speciﬁc underlying types.
At this point evolutionary psychology’s notion that the mind is massively
modular may contribute to behavioural genomics. As mentioned, according
to evolutionary psychology psychological processes are seen as solutions to
speciﬁc adaptive problems that our ancestors had to solve and that affected
reproductive success. The functions of the brain and other neurophysiolo-
gical bases are supposed to have evolved in a functionally specialised way.
This feature, known as the domain speciﬁcity of the human mind, results
in the hypothesis that the mind has a large number of so-called ‘content-
rich expert systems’ (Duchaine et al. 2001) containing assumptions, favourite
expectations and special inference procedures or heuristics to deal with
the information and operations the module is sensitive for or prone to
69
(Gigerenzer and Hug 1992; Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Gigerenzer 2001).
Among the specialised systems suggested by evolutionary psychologists are
such modules as cheating detection (Cosmides 1989; Gigerenzer and Hug
1992), face recognition (De Haan 2001), emotion recognition in faces (Van
Honk et al. 2001), disgust (Rozin et al. 1986; Rozin and Fallon 1987; Rozin
et al. 1993), food aversion (Garcia et al. 1955; Garcia and Koelling 1966;
Garcia et al. 1977; Garcia 1981), etc.
As an illustration of how evolutionary psychologists carve psychological
phenomena at its evolutionary joints, let us brieﬂy consider the example of
semantic knowledge. Research in evolutionary psychology has indicated that
semantic memory is divided in two systems: one for assessing semantic infor-
mation about animate objects and one for inanimate objects (Duchaine et
al. 2001). These categories represent ‘evolutionarily adapted domain-speciﬁc
knowledge systems’ subserved by distinct neural mechanisms (Caramazza
and Shelton 1998). Further distinctions are also suggested, for instance
between edible and inedible things. This way, a ﬁne-grained categorisation
of psychological mechanisms is developed based on evolutionary thought.
Behavioural genomics may beneﬁt from these ﬁner grained evolutionary
categorisations because they may be genetically relevant. The different
modules are thought to have evolved under selection of different (composi-
tions of) genes. So, it may be expected that the modularity of the behaviour
categorised by evolutionary psychology somehow maps onto a genomic
organisation. In other words, the way that evolutionary psychology describes
the human cognitive architecture should provide hints at the organisation of
the genomic background. Moreover, modules are domain speciﬁc: they are
highly specialised mechanisms serving very speciﬁc tasks. They have been
selected because they produce, in a regular fashion, adaptive behaviour, but
they do so only within a domain of a speciﬁc kind of content. Changing
the content outside the evolutionary context renders the module irrelevant
or even misleading. That means that the generalisations describing the rela-
tionships between modules and behaviour remain invariant but only within
the domain to which the module is an adaptation. If it is indeed true that
different genes underlie different modules, it follows that the generalisations
describing gene-behaviour relationships will be likewise domain speciﬁc: the
domain of invariance of gene-behaviour generalisations will probably corres-
pond to a more or lesser extent to the domain speciﬁcity of the adaptive
solutions those genes have been selected for. Thus, the boundaries of the
domain of invariance of genomic generalisations may be brought to light
by investigating the domain-speciﬁcity of the adaptive solutions those genes
have been selected for. This way, evolutionary psychology not only provides
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hints at the genomic organisation, but also helps to describe the domain of
changes under which genomic generalisations are invariant.
This line of reasoning also leads to a more practical recommendation
concerning the choice of endophenotypes. At present, evolutionary consid-
erations are not among the criteria for useful endophenotypes (see, e.g., De
Geus and Boomsma 2001). But if the organisation of the genome corresponds
to the adaptive organisation of the human mind and if gene-adaptation rela-
tionships are less fragile than more general gene-behaviour relationships,
it might be predicted that genes for adaptations will be relatively easier to
detect than genes fort traits which are not adaptations. This suggests that
the endophenotype approach to behavioural genomics can be improved by
focussing on adaptive endophenotypes. Behavioural genomics may try to
make the way they ‘divide and conquer’ human behaviour in agreement
with the way evolutionists carve behaviour at its evolutionary joints. Besides
choosing endophenotypes like inhibitory control and executive functioning,
choosing evolutionary relevant endophenotypes can thus be a further advance
for behavioural genomic research.
A suggestion which originated in linguistics and has been adopted by
evolutionary psychologists provides another, more detailed example of where
evolutionary considerations contribute to behavioural genomics (Wimsatt
1986; but see also his rethought and clariﬁed analysis in Wimsatt 1999).
The concept of a Universal Grammar refers to a set of basic principles
that humans possess at birth to develop the production and perception of
linguistic utterances, the grammar of which is constrained to certain sets of
rules and combinations of rules (cf. e.g., Chomsky 2000; Jackendoff 2002;
Pinker 1999). Theories concerning language acquisition suppose that there is
a genetic disposition (Gi) to produce a basic set of grammatical rules. These
rules, however, can take different forms, e.g., X can take the form of X1 or X2,
depending on an environmental input. An example of such grammatical rule
is the so-called PRO-drop rule which allows the speaker to omit the subject
in a sentence (Pinker 1995). This rule is set to ‘on’ in Spanish (which is
a null-subject language where one can say ‘goes to the beach’ without a
subject) whereas the rule is set to ‘off’ in English (where one cannot say
the equivalent). In the child’s grammar the PRO-drop rule is set to ‘on’ or
‘off’ depending on the input (e.g., English or Spanish). Other, more subtle
linguistic rules (Y1, Y2, Y3) will depend on whether X takes the form of X1
and X2. For instance, once X is set to X1, Y3 is no longer possible (though
X2 → Y3 still is possible), which leaves the environment open to inﬂuence
the decision between Y1 and Y2 under the condition of X1. In short there are
genetic sources for the variations {G→X1→ Y1}, {G→ X1→ Y2}, {G→
X2→ Y3}, which depend on the environment to be expressed in one way or
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the other. In a case like this evolutionary considerations could come up with
analyses that lead to predictions about the organisation of the genome, which
probably could not have been made on the basis of behavioural genomics
alone. Yet, it remains a matter of empirical investigation to ﬁnd out whether
there is one gene (or combination of genes) that is responsible for the Xi →
Yj sequence, or whether X and Y are under the inﬂuence of different genes.
4.2. The distribution of genomic generalisations
Besides exceptions, genomic generalisations typically lack universality.
There is often more than one genetic mechanism underlying the same (beha-
vioural) phenomenon. Information about the distribution of genes and genetic
mechanisms is therefore an essential part of genomic explaining. What is
needed is a search within a population for the genes involved in the general-
isation. It is, inter alia, important for the signiﬁcance of a ﬁnding: even in the
case that a gene is without exception followed by a speciﬁc trait, if the gene
is very rare while other causes are more common, it explains relatively little.3
An example is the gene BRCA1. Individuals with a mutation in BRCA1 have
a very high risk for developing breast cancer (60–80%), but the gene is rela-
tively rare and explains about 3–7% of all breast cancers (Bishop 1999; Keen
and Davidson, 2003). Another behavioural example is Creutzfeldt Jacob’s
Disease (CJD) which is associated with the PRNP gene: a mutation in PRNP
invariantly causes CJD, but the gene is responsible for only 10–15% of all
cases of CJD (DeArmond and Bouzamondo 2002).
Although genetic researchers are able to estimate and calculate the distri-
bution of genes, what is usually lacking is an explanation or an account
of these distributions. What is missing is a higher level perspective which
explains why the distributions are as they are. Behavioural genomics does not
systematically account for the way genes are distributed, e.g., among different
populations or geographical regions or other environments. It remains a mere
description of the scattering of genetic mutations within a more or less well
deﬁned class of subjects.
Evolutionary psychology may contribute to an account of the distributions
of genes since the latter results from the inheritance of the genes from parent
to offspring. Especially individuals that are well adapted to their environment
are more likely to transmit the genes they carry and, as a result, those genes
whose effects enhance the reproductive ﬁtness of the individual in a certain
environment are probably more common there. So, a particular distribution
of genes is the result of the history of the adaptive consequences of the genes
involved. Thus, knowledge of the adaptive features of human behaviour and
their functions in the adaptations in the ages of their original appearance as
a feature may be of help for a systematic description of genetic distribu-
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tions. Gene-adaptation relationships can be supplemented with knowledge
of adaptation-environment relationships as revealed by evolutionary psycho-
logy. The latter relationship may suggest in which environments the genes
are more likely distributed, and, more importantly, suggests an explanation of
why these distributions are as they are. Thus, a second way that an adaptive
account may contribute to behavioural genomics is by accounting for the
genetic distributions that are relevant for genomic generalisations.
An example is the already mentioned disease PKU (Barendregt 2003a).
This genetic mutation causing the disease is relatively uncommon, but more
frequent in countries like West-Scotland and Ireland. The distribution of
the mutation can be explained by an adaptive account (Woolf 1986). The
mutation results in a mutant enzyme which provides some protection against
a speciﬁc toxin, viz. Ochratoxin A. Due to this protection, heterozygous
pregnant women (who are themselves not affected by the disease because
PKU is a recessive disorder) have fewer spontanious abortions than others.
Ochratoxin A is produced by moulds that prefer to grow in mild and wet
climates. Combined with the fact that West-Scotland and Ireland suffered
serious famines in the past which makes it more probable that mouldy grain is
consumed, this explains why this gene is relatively frequent in those regions.
To avoid misunderstanding, the present authors do not recommend evolu-
tionary psychology to completely abandon their focus on mechanisms which
are universal in the human species. The point is that if adaptive genetic
variation is also taken into account, the research strategy of evolutionary
psychology might become relevant for behavioural genomics. Evolutionary
psychology does not need to radically change their strategy: evolutionary
psychologists already recognise that genetic origins of behaviour leave room
for variation of two kinds. If a certain gene (or combination of genes)
produces a strong tendency to develop a certain behaviour in a standard way,
room for variation in the expression remains (i.e., due to genetic room within
constraints) as well as room for variation in the expressed behaviour that is
due to environmental inﬂuences on the behaviour.
5. Conclusion
The view proposed in this paper is limited in several respects. First of all,
we have only discussed the possible relevance of an adaptive account for
behavioural genomics and not visa versa. Also, it was asserted that, because
behavioural genomics is about individual variants, only adaptive genetic vari-
ation provides points of contact and not pan-human uniform adaptations.
Recent developments in behavioural genomics, however, suggest a more
complicated picture. Although behavioural genomics emphasises individual
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differences, its account may extend beyond variance and throw light on beha-
vioural uniformity as well. This is a result of the shift from quantitative to
molecular analyses, which brings with it a conceptual shift from genes as
an abstract statistical factor for individual differences to genes as physical
entities with ‘real’ causal powers. While quantitative analyses remain silent
on the exact relation between genes and phenotypes, molecular studies try
to open this black box by targeting the causal paths that lead from genes to
behaviour aiming at knowledge about the intervening mechanisms by which
different genes bring about different behavioural outcomes (Plomin and Essi
2001). Such knowledge not only includes behavioural variants but is also
advantageous to behavioural research focusing on species universals: laying
bare the intervening mechanisms provides a basis for understanding the func-
tional anatomy of neurones and brain parts and their role in behavioural
performance (De Geus and Boomsma 2001). Consequently, adaptive explan-
ations not only complement explanations of individual variation, but they
may, in turn, also beneﬁt from genomic explanations. Hence, the relationship
might also work the other way round. Another consequence is that the overlap
between evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics might include
more than just adaptive genetic variation: adaptive uniformity might also be
a shared domain of interest.
Secondly, we have focused on the uniﬁcation of adaptive and genetic
explanations as a conjunction, that is, in certain situations genetic explana-
tions can be ampliﬁed by adaptive explanations. What has not been examined
is whether one approach may be reduced to the other or whether the two
may dissolve into a third theory. The shift from statistical to molecular
analyses might provide grounds for a stronger kind of uniﬁcation than mere
conjunction. For instance, a molecularly based behavioural genetics raises the
question whether the reduction relation might be applicable between evolu-
tionary psychology and behavioural genomics. These questions are similar
to the older debate in the philosophy of biology on the reduction of func-
tional biology to molecular biology (see e.g. Rosenberg 1997; Schaffner
1993: chapter 9). The outcome of that debate seems to be an antireductionist
consensus partly based on the multiple realisability argument (Hull 1974;
Kitcher 1984; Sober 1999). If we may extend those ideas to the relation
between evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics, a preliminary
conclusion might be that reduction may prove not to be the appropriate kind
of uniﬁcation there.
Finally, we have not criticised the foundations or assumptions of either
behavioural genomics or evolutionary psychology. But both approaches have
not gone unchallenged (e.g., Gottlieb 1998; Looren de Jong and Van der Steen
1998). For example, the thesis that the human mind is massively modular has
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been contested (e.g., Buller and Hardcastle 2000), which is pertinent in the
context of this paper, because if the modularity of the mind has to be rejected
one of our proposals why evolutionary concerns may be relevant for behavi-
oural genomics would be undermined. Of course, it might turn out that one
of the two traditions (or both) is essentially based on mistaken assumptions.
But, if that would be the case there would be no question any more whether
one might contribute to the other. It should be kept in mind that it is not our
aim to scrutinise the assumptions of the two biological research programs in
psychology but to investigate the possibility of uniﬁcation-relationships.
Taking these limitations into account, we conclude that evolutionary
psychology and behavioural genomics need not be considered separate disci-
plines. They need not be disconnected islands between which no communi-
cation is possible. The areas of both disciplines partly overlap, at least
where genetic variation is adaptive. In these overlapping areas points of
contact exist. We have proposed two such points of contact where evolu-
tionary psychology might be relevant for genomic explanations. Because of
their lack of lawfulness, biological explanations require an account of the
domain of invariance of their generalisations and an account of the distri-
bution of the mechanisms. These accounts may be provided by an adaptive
perspective.
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Notes
1 What it generally means exactly for two theories to be mutually consistent is not discussed.
Apparent inconsistencies, however, sufﬁce in any concrete case to block attempts for uniﬁca-
tion and should be resolved ﬁrstly.
2 One example of a principle that might be extremely phylogenetically conservative is the
genetic code. The code seems to be universal for all organisms, which is explained by Crick
by the fact that once the code had been established any changes in it would have had enormous
and detrimental effects. Many researchers, however, think that the genetic code is still evolving
and hence not universal.
3 John Beatty has developed the idea that the non-universality of biological theories and the
occurrence of relative signiﬁcance disputes in the biological discipline are related phenomena
(Beatty 1997).
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